THE GREAT MOON RACE: THE FINISH LINE
Copyright (c) 1994 by Andrew J. LePage
The author gives permission to any group or individual wishing
to distribute this article, so long as proper credit is given
and the article is reproduced in its entirety.
I still remember that hot summer evening twenty-five years ago
this month. My parents let me stay up well past my bedtime to watch
the earliest historical event that I can remember. I clearly recall
watching the television with the image of Mission Control fixed on
the screen and listening to Walter Cronkite of CBS-TV News trying to
explain to the audience the significance of the cryptic conversations
taking place. For what seemed like an eternity I waited; something
that any seven year-old finds difficult to do. I had watched the
landing that afternoon and knew what was about to happen would be a
first. However, having grown up in the Space Age with its steady
diet of celestial firsts - and being only seven - I did not fully
appreciate the upcoming event's significance.
Finally, just before eleven p.m. Eastern Daylight Time (EDT), the
image on the TV changed and a puzzling, ghostly image appeared. At
first I could not decipher what I was looking at. Then a faint human
figure appeared on the screen. I quickly realized that it was an
astronaut making his way down the Lunar Module (LM) ladder - but
the image was upside down! After a few moments the picture righted
itself. Just minutes before eleven (10:56:20 p.m. EDT, to be exact),
a traveler from the planet Earth named Neil Armstrong stepped off the
LM foot pad and touched the face of the Moon for the first time.
It was not too long after that I succumbed to the inevitable and
fell asleep, missing the events that would follow: A second human
named Edwin "Buzz" Aldrin coming down the ladder, the planting of the
American flag, the gathering of lunar samples, and more. The United
States had won what some at the time believed was a one-sided race
to the Moon.
What happened exactly the next day I do not remember. It was just
part of the now blurry mosaic of typical events in the life of any kid
during a summer vacation in the late Nineteen Sixties in an ordinary
New England mill town: Playing with my friends Kevin and Mike, running
under the sprinkler to stay cool, building forts in the woods, staying
clear of my sister's friend Diane who obviously wanted to kiss me, and
occasionally wondering what third grade with Sister Bertha would be like.
Most of the estimated one billion people who watched the previous
evening's events, including myself, were unaware of what was then
taking place at a different mission control center deep inside the
Soviet Union. A large automated spacecraft of unproven design was
attempting to make its way to the lunar surface from orbit. The
crash of LUNA 15 that afternoon would be just the latest in a string
of failures that ultimately denied the Soviet Union their winning a
significant piece of the race to the Moon.
It would be several years before I would learn of the events
of that day. It would be even more years before I read about the
little-known and then mostly rumored string of failures that preceded
it. Only with the advent of Peristroika and the subsequent breakup of
the Soviet Union in the early 1990s would the bits and pieces of the
real story finally start to trickle out from behind the crumbled Iron
Curtain. Although many pieces are still missing, we in the West now
know that there was indeed a race to the Moon and how the Soviets
tried to either win parts of that race or at the very least upstage
the American effort.
The Grand Plan
During the last year that lead up to the APOLLO 11 mission in
1969, the Soviet Union was working frantically on a three-pronged
assault on the Moon. The first part of this effort was a program to
send a man on a looping trajectory that would make a simple pass by
the Moon and return him to Earth. The spacecraft that would perform
this mission, known as the L-1, was a six-ton (5,600-kilogram) vehicle
based on the SOYUZ design, whose descendant is still used today to
ferry crews to and from Russia's MIR Earth-orbiting space station.
From the outside, the L-1 looked like the three-part SOYUZ but
lacked its spherical orbital module. Other major differences were
less obvious, including a modified propulsion system, a beefed up heat
shield, long-distance communication systems, and more. The spacecraft
was well-suited for its simple mission to carry a lone cosmonaut on
a week-long circumlunar mission. A successful mission before the
American Moon landing would allow the Soviets to claim that they
were the first to send a human to the Moon.
Previous tests of the L-1 were less than successful. First they
were plagued by failures of the then-new PROTON launch vehicle. The
first mission to make it beyond Earth parking orbit, ZOND 4, was
launched in early March of 1968. To avoid unnecessary complications,
ZOND 4 was aimed directly away from the trajectory-distorting influ-
ences of the Moon and its rather lumpy gravitational field. The
mission was simply to test the L-1 spacecraft at lunar distances,
especially the all-important communications system.
During the six days following launch, cosmonauts in a bunker on
Earth spoke to mission controllers through a relay transmitter on
board the spacecraft to test these systems. Upon return from cislunar
space, ZOND 4 was to make a relatively low-G, double-skip entry and
land in Soviet territory. Then, just before this complicated maneuver,
the probe's astro-orientation system failed, forcing the descent module
to make a simple ballistic entry into Earth's atmosphere. With the
quickly descending probe coming down over the Gulf of Guinea off the
coast of Africa, far from any Soviet recovery ship, the spacecraft
was deliberately blown up to prevent it from falling into the hands
of American intelligence.
The next attempt to test the L-1 was scheduled for July 21, 1968.
With the American manned lunar program on the verge of shifting into
overdrive, Soviet officials needed to launch this L-1 towards the Moon
in a full test of the circumlunar mission. On board were a number
of biological specimens to assess the effects of exposure to the
near-lunar environment, a photographic system to take high-quality
images of the lunar surface as the spacecraft passed the Moon, and,
like ZOND 4, equipment to perform long-distance voice communication
tests. Before the launch, a crack was discovered in the Block D
escape stage of the PROTON, forcing the removal of the launch vehicle
from the pad for repairs. Two months later, ZOND 5 was finally
launched on September 15 and successfully sent towards the Moon.
Three days after launch, ZOND 5 made its single close pass of the
Moon at a minimum distance of 1,210 miles (1,950 kilometers). Its
precisely tailored trajectory then allowed the spacecraft to return to
Earth without any major propulsive maneuvers. Unfortunately, failure
struck just before entry into Earth's atmosphere. Again the astro-
orientation system ceased to function properly and the descent module
was forced to make a punishing high-G ballistic entry. This time,
however, a Soviet tracking ship named the VASILY GOLOVIN was stationed
under the path of ZOND 5 and was able to recover the wayward spacecraft
after its splashdown in the Indian Ocean.
By this time, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) had informed
NASA decision makers of the Soviet Union's intent to fly a manned
circumlunar mission soon. With the successful Earth orbit mission of
APOLLO 7 in October, the APOLLO Command and Service Modules (CSM) were
deemed ready for a lunar mission. However, with the ground testing of
the LM months behind schedule, there was no way for the Americans to
mount a previously planned lunar orbit test of the LM to beat the
Soviets. Instead, it was decided that only the CSM would be launched
on a lunar orbit mission in late December. The race to be first
*around* the Moon, if not actually landing on it yet, was on.
With the L-1 yet to perform successfully, Soviet engineers knew
they needed at least one good end-to-end test of their circumlunar
spacecraft before committing to a manned flight. The memory of the
failure of SOYUZ 1 in 1967 with its then less-than-proven design and
the loss of its pilot Vladimir Komarov was still fresh in the minds
of everyone involved. Another test, ZOND 6, was launched on November
10. This would be the last chance to test the L-1 on its circumlunar
mission and still mount a manned L-1 mission before the Americans
launched APOLLO 8.
The mission of ZOND 6 was virtually identical to its predecessor.
Three days after launch, the probe swung to within 1,500 miles (2,420
kilometers) of the lunar surface and began its long fall back towards
Earth. Unlike the previous pair of tests, the L-1 astro-orientation
system functioned properly and ZOND 6 successfully executed a double-
skip entry, thus assuring a landing in Soviet territory. But the
return to Earth would prove to be less than perfect. The parachute
deployed prematurely and the landing capsule crashed. If it had been
manned, ZOND's occupant would have been killed. While the Soviets
publicly hailed the mission as a success, it was yet another blow to
their lunar program.
As the December 7 launch window was approaching, a heated debate
was taking place whether to commit a man to the next L-1 launch. The
cosmonauts training for the mission wrote to the Politburo, stating
that they were prepared to take the risk and argued that the mission
would have a better chance at success with a man on board to take over
in case of another automated system failure. It is rumored that a
crew was chosen and that a cosmonaut would fly on this last mission
before the upcoming launch of the American APOLLO 8.
After the PROTON with its L-1 was rolled out onto the pad, a
series of problems with the launch vehicle arose. Before the problems
could be fixed, the launch window closed and the Soviets' last chance
to be first to the Moon was lost. The mission of APOLLO 8, which
entered lunar orbit on Christmas Eve of 1968 with three Americans on
board, was a success. American astronauts, not a Soviet cosmonaut,
were the first to visit the Moon.
The following month, the now repaired launch vehicle was rolled
out onto the pad for another unmanned test of the L-1. A human
passenger would not be risked this time, since there was not a space
first at stake any longer. The spacecraft was launched unmanned.
During ascent to Earth parking orbit, the launch vehicle exploded upon
ignition of the PROTON's second stage. The fact that the launch
escape system also failed to operate must have sent a chill through
the ranks of the cosmonauts training for the L-1 mission. If a
cosmonaut was on board, he would have surely perished. While work
on the L-1 circumlunar missions continued, it was realized that its
passengers would not be the first to the Moon. Still, these flights
would be valuable in support of the second prong of the Soviet Union's
lunar assault.
The Long Shot
The second prong of the Soviet assault on the Moon was an actual
manned landing on the lunar surface. During 1968, it became clear to
Soviet leaders that a manned landing by a Russian cosmonaut would not
occur until 1970 or 1971 at the earliest. Delays in the development
of the Soviet Moon rocket, the N-1, made an earlier date unlikely.
Delays in the design and testing of the Lunar Orbiter Cabin (LOK), and
especially the Lunar Cabin (LK) that would make the descent to the
surface, made it impossible. Nonetheless, the program schedule was
pushed to the limit in hopes that the American APOLLO program might
somehow falter, affording the Soviets the opportunity to overtake
them in the next year or so.
The first and largest component ready for testing would be the N-1
Moon rocket itself. On November 25, 1967, a mockup of the N-1 was
installed on launch pad Number 1 for seventeen days of electrical
tests. The first flight-ready launch vehicle was erected on the same
pad on May 7, 1968, in preparation for a test launch. The booster had
to be returned to the assembly building, however, after cracks were
found in the first stage structure, possibly caused by the attachment
of the payload.
After months of assessment and repairs, this vehicle was again
placed on the launch pad in November, only to be replaced with another
mockup for further tests and launch team training. Finally, in mid-
January of 1969, N-1 Number 3L was erected on the pad with its payload
for its first test flight. The test would be risky since, to save
time and money, the large cluster of first-stage engines was never
tested as a group.
Since neither the LOK nor LK were ready for a test flight at
that time, the Soviets used a modified L-1 known as the L-1S as the
vehicle's primary payload. The N-1 would place the L-1S and a dummy
LK on a trajectory towards the Moon. Once there, the L-1S alone would
enter lunar orbit to take high-resolution photographs of proposed
landing sites and then return to Earth with the exposed film. For the
mission, an Orientation Engine Module (DOK) would be attached to the
front of the basic L-1. The DOK would slow the L-1S enough to place
it into lunar orbit, after which it would be jettisoned. The L-1S
would then use its own propulsion system, located in the Instrument
Module, to accelerate out of lunar orbit for the return to Earth.
The spacecraft would perform a double-skip entry as in previous L-1
flights as a test of the nearly identical LOK Descent Module.
After 28 days of on-pad preparations and an additional one-day
weather delay, the first N-1 lifted off into clear skies on February
21, 1969. Seconds after launch trouble began. Two of the first
stage's thirty NK-33 engines shut down due to a problem with the KORD
control system which guided the mammoth rocket. The launch vehicle
was designed to operate with as many as four first-stage engines shut
down, so the flight continued with the other engines compensating for
the loss. Twenty-five seconds after launch, the engines were throttled
back as programmed as the N-1 passed through maximum dynamic pressure,
or max-q.
About 65 seconds into the flight, the engines were throttled back
up to full power. At this point the lack of adequate testing of this
Space Age leviathan became apparent. The engines throttled up more
quickly than expected, causing stronger than planned vibrations.
A liquid oxygen pipeline burst and started a fire in the engine
compartment before the KORD could shut down the affected engine. The
surrounding engines and turbopumps quickly overheated and exploded.
After seventy seconds of flight, the KORD finally shut down all
engines and the launch escape system was activated. The L-1S capsule
was recovered 20 to 22 miles (32 to 35 kilometers) downrange. The
now powerless N-1 slammed into the Kazhak steppes and exploded some
30 miles (48 kilometers) from its launch pad.
Undeterred by this first failure, a second N-1 was modified and
prepared for launch. With the successful tests of the American LM in
Earth orbit during the APOLLO 9 mission in March and the test in lunar
orbit by APOLLO 10 in May, only a failure of the APOLLO 11 mission
and a successful N-1 test would leave the Soviets with any chance of
landing a man on the Moon first.
By mid-1969, the second N-1 launch pad was ready and a mockup
installed for fitting and electrical tests. Finally, on July 3, the
second N-1, Number 5L, took off from pad Number 1 with another L-1S as
its primary payload. It immediately encountered problems when debris
in the oxidizer tank was ingested by one of the first-stage engines,
causing its turbopump to explode. This explosion caused a second
engine to fail, which in turn caused a chain reaction, eliminating
several neighboring engines as well as damaging the KORD's electrical
control system.
The launch escape system was automatically activated, pulling yet
another L-1S descent module away from an N-1. The capsule came down
about one-half mile (one kilometer) from the pad, while the fully
fueled N-1 crashed into its launch pad eighteen seconds after launch.
The impact destroyed the rocket, pad Number 1, and heavily damaged
the newly completed pad Number 2.
The N-1 was in desperate need of modification. Almost two years
of launch pad reconstruction would be needed before the Moon rocket
could be flown again. With their hopes to beat the Americans to a
manned Moon landing surely dashed, the Soviets had only one last card
to play.
The Ace in the Hole
The last prong of the Soviets' plan to beat the Americans to
the Moon did not involve a manned spacecraft at all. As part of a
long-term plan to explore the Moon, designers at the Babakin Design
Bureau had come up with plans for unmanned lunar landers, rovers, and
orbiters somewhat similar in size and mission to the long-abandoned
American PROSPECTOR program. The exact origin and original mission
for this family of spacecraft is still unknown, but it was likely
meant to be used as a manned mission pathfinder.
At this point in history, though, one of the proposed missions
could have been to undermine the scientific justification for the
manned APOLLO missions. By March of 1969, the Soviets publicly
admitted to planning an unmanned lunar sample return mission. The
major selling point of this program was that an unmanned spacecraft
could return samples of the lunar surface for a fraction of the cost
of a manned mission and at no risk to a human crew. It would be a
major coup if the Soviets could do this before an American manned
landing and could totally undermine political support in America for
any manned lunar mission if one of the early APOLLO test missions or
the first manned landing attempt had failed.
With the real possibility of stealing some of APOLLO's thunder,
the first launch of this six-ton (5,700-kilogram) sample return
spacecraft took place on April 15, 1969. It never got far since its
PROTON booster was rumored to have exploded on the launch pad. A
second attempt on June 14 made it as far as the ignition of the
PROTON's second-stage, at which point it exploded.
Since March, tensions between the Soviets and Chinese had erupted
almost to the point of war, with several skirmishes taking place along
their common border. During this time an unusually large number of
Soviet photoreconnaissance satellites were launched to observe Chinese
troop movements. With this heightened sense of alert, one cannot help
but wonder if such 'unimportant' flights as a lunar mission got the
short end of the stick when it came to obtaining resources for launch
preparations.
There was only one last chance to beat the Americans and get
samples of the Moon back to Earth before the APOLLO 11 mission.
On July 13, 1969, just three days before the launch of APOLLO 11,
LUNA 15 went into a trajectory towards the Moon. After a trajectory
correction maneuver the day after launch, LUNA 15 fired its rockets
again on July 17, entering a 34 by 126-mile (55 by 203-kilometer)
lunar orbit with APOLLO 11 just two days behind it. On the day APOLLO
11 entered lunar orbit, LUNA 15 altered its orbit to 5.6 by 137 miles
(9 by 203 kilometers), inclined 126 degrees to the lunar equator. At
this point there were worries in the U.S. that LUNA 15 would somehow
interfere with the manned APOLLO mission. Assurances were quickly
given by the Soviets that this would not be the case and both missions
continued.
On July 20, only hours before the scheduled landing of APOLLO 11,
LUNA 15 made yet another orbital change, resulting in a 10 by 68-mile
(16 by 110-kilometer) orbit inclined 127 degrees. It was not until
the next day, after astronauts Neil Armstrong and Edwin Aldrin had
already landed their Lunar Module named EAGLE on Mare Tranquilitas -
the Sea of Tranquility - and walked on the Moon, that LUNA 15 made
its last retrorocket burn and began its descent to the lunar surface.
Unfortunately, the lander crashed at a speed of 300 miles per hour
(480 kilometers per hour) at 17 degrees north, 60 degrees east in
Mare Crisium, the Sea of Crises. The Soviets simply announced that
LUNA 15 had completed its mission and left it at that. It would be
almost twenty years before it was officially admitted that LUNA 15
was a failed sample return attempt.
Even if LUNA 15 had succeeded at this landing attempt, it would
not have returned until the day after the return of APOLLO 11 on July
24. This mission did spend one day longer in lunar orbit than was
typical of later sample missions, making it possible that there
were some problems with the spacecraft or tracking it or accurately
predicting its orbit. If LUNA 15 had made it down in three days
instead of four, or if the APOLLO 11 mission had failed to return
samples, the Soviets would have had their space first. Instead, the
Soviets had several tons of wreckage on the lunar surface and at best
a brief blurb in Western newspapers buried several pages behind the
news of the successful mission of APOLLO 11.
Postscript
Even after the failure to beat the Americans to the Moon, the
Soviets continued through 1969 with their lunar missions. On August
8, 1969, the Soviets successfully launched an L-1 spacecraft on
another unmanned circumlunar flight. ZOND 7 flew by the Moon, coming
to within 1,200 miles (2,000 kilometers) of the surface three days
after launch. On August 14 the latest L-1's descent module executed
a perfect entry and landing, making it the first totally successful
flight of the L-1 design.
Plans at that time called for another unmanned flight in December.
The first manned L-1 circumlunar flight would then be launched in
April of 1970 to coincide with the one hundredth anniversary of the
birth of Vladimir Ilyich Lenin (1870-1924), the leader of the Russian
Revolution in 1917. Electrical tests of the last unmanned L-1 space-
craft took place between September and November of 1969, but the L-1
manned program was postponed and finally scrapped, possibly because
of the success of the second American lunar landing, APOLLO 12, in
November.
Sample return mission attempts also continued in 1969, but with
less success. A mission launched on September 23 got stranded in its
Earth parking orbit when the PROTON's Block D escape stage failed to
operate properly. This attempt received the generic Soviet moniker
of KOSMOS 300. Another attempt launched on October 22 suffered a
similar fate and was designated KOSMOS 305 after it failed to leave
Earth orbit. Unlike the L-1 program, however, the Soviets would
continue with their unmanned lunar program into 1970 and beyond,
advertising it as the preferred, cheaper, and safer means to explore
the Moon. It was hoped that 1970 would be luckier for the Soviets
than the previous two years.
Summary of Lunar Missions: Second Half 1968 to 1969
_____________________________________________________________________________
Name Launch Country Weight Launch Vehicle
Date lbs (kg)
_____________________________________________________________________________
ZOND 5 Sep 14, 1968 USSR 12,300 (5600) ? PROTON
Partially successful unmanned L-1 circumlunar test
ZOND 6 Nov 10, 1968 USSR 12,300 (5600) ? PROTON
Partially successful unmanned L-1 circumlunar test
APOLLO 8 Dec 21, 1968 US 63,631 (28,897) SATURN V
First manned lunar orbiter
(Unannounced) Jan 19, 1969 ? USSR 12,300 (5600) ? PROTON
Possible launch failure of unmanned L-1 circumlunar test
(Unannounced) Feb 21, 1969 USSR 15,000 (7000) ? N-1
Unsuccessful test of N-1 carrying L-1S photographic
lunar orbiter
(Unannounced) Apr 15, 1969 USSR 12,600 (5700) ? PROTON
Launch failure of sample return attempt
APOLLO 10 May 18, 1969 US 94,325 (42,836) SATURN V
Second manned lunar orbiter and test of LM
(Unannounced) Jun 14, 1969 USSR 12,600 (5700) ? PROTON
Launch failure of sample return attempt
(Unannounced) Jul 3, 1969 USSR 15,000 (7000) ? N-1
Unsuccessful test of N-1 carrying L-1S photographic
lunar orbiter
LUNA 15 Jul 13, 1969 USSR 12,600 (5700) ? PROTON
Unsuccessful lunar sample return attempt
APOLLO 11 Jul 16, 1969 US 96,584 (43,862) SATURN V
First manned lunar landing
ZOND 7 Aug 7, 1969 USSR 12,300 (5600) ? PROTON
Unmanned L-1 circumlunar test
KOSMOS 300 Sep 23, 1969 USSR 12,600 (5700) ? PROTON
Unsuccessful lunar sample return attempt
KOSMOS 305 Oct 22, 1969 USSR 12,600 (5700) ? PROTON
Unsuccessful lunar sample return attempt
APOLLO 12 Nov 14, 1969 US 96,681 (43,906) SATURN V
Second manned lunar landing
____________________________________________________________________________
Bibliography -
Baker, David, THE HISTORY OF MANNED SPACEFLIGHT, 1981
Clark, Phillip, THE SOVIET MANNED SPACE PROGRAM, 1988
Gatland, Kenneth, ILLUSTRATED ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SPACE TECHNOLOGY, 1988
Harvey, Brian, "Promise Unfulfilled: The Soviet Unmanned Moon
Programme 1969-1988", JOURNAL OF THE BRITISH INTERPLANETARY SOCIETY
(JBIS), September 1990
Hendrickx, B., "Correspondence: Soviet Manned Lunar Programme",
JOURNAL OF THE BRITISH INTERPLANETARY SOCIETY, May 1994
Johnson, Nicholas, HANDBOOK OF SOVIET LUNAR AND PLANETARY
EXPLORATION, 1979
Lebedev, D. A., "The N1-L3 Programme", SPACEFLIGHT, September 1992
Lebedev, D. A., "The N1-L3 Programme", SPACEFLIGHT, February 1993
LePage, Andrew J., "The Great Moon Race: The Soviet Story, Parts
1 and 2", EJASA, December 1990 and January 1991
Matson, Wayne R. (Ed.), COSMONAUTICS: A COLORFUL HISTORY, 1994
Pirard, Theo, "The Cosmonauts Missed the Moon!", SPACEFLIGHT,
December 1993
Pesavento, Peter, "A Review of Rumoured Launch Failures in the
Soviet Manned Program. Part 2: The Lunar Project/1968-1969", JOURNAL
OF THE BRITISH INTERPLANETARY SOCIETY, September 1990
Wilson, Andrew, (JANE'S) SOLAR SYSTEM LOG, 1987
Yasinsky, Alexander, "The N-1 Rocket Programme", SPACEFLIGHT,
July 1993
About the Author -
Andrew J. LePage is a scientist at a small R&D company in the
Boston, Massachusetts area involved in space science image and data
analysis. He has written many articles on the history of spaceflight
and astronomy over the past few years that have been published in many
magazines throughout North America and Europe. Andrew has been a
serious observer of the Soviet/CIS space program for over one dozen
years.
Andrew's Internet address is: lepage@bur.visidyne.com
Andrew is the author of the following EJASA articles:
"Mars 1994" - March 1990
"The Great Moon Race: The Soviet Story, Part One" - December 1990
"The Great Moon Race: The Soviet Story, Part Two" - January 1991
"The Mystery of ZOND 2" - April 1991
"The Great Moon Race: New Findings" - May 1991
"The Great Moon Race: In the Beginning..." - May 1992
"The Great Moon Race: The Commitment" - August 1992
"The Great Moon Race: The Long Road to Success" - September 1992
"Recent Soviet Lunar and Planetary Program Revelations" - May 1993
"The Great Moon Race: The Red Moon" - July 1993
"The Great Moon Race: The Tide Turns" - August 1993
"The Great Moon Race: The Final Lap - November 1993
"A Personal Adventure in Home Computing: The Origin of Comet
Shoemaker-Levy 9" - March 1994
THE ELECTRONIC JOURNAL OF THE ASTRONOMICAL SOCIETY OF THE ATLANTIC
July 1994 - Vol. 5, No. 12
Copyright (c) 1994 - ASA
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(_) Computer Laboratory - Department of Communication
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